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The objective of the paper is (i) to help fill the gap in knowledge on the long-term economic history of Poland; (ii) to provide a new perspective to the debate on the economic future of Poland, with a special focus on its historically unprecedented post-transition growth experience; and (iii) to analyze critically long-term growth projections for Poland. The paper argues that (i) Poland has just had probably the best 20 years in its economic history, growing the fastest among all European economies and one of the fastest worldwide; (ii) by 2013, it Poland achieved levels of income, quality of life, and well-being likely never experienced before, including This paper is a product of the Private and Financial Sector Development Department and Central Europe and the Baltics Country Department, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mpiatkowski@worldbank.org.
relative to Western Europe, a natural benchmark; and (iii) Poland is well placed to continue converging with the Western European levels of income, permanently moving from the economic periphery of Europe, where it languished for centuries, to the European economic center. The twenty-first century thus promises to become Poland's new Golden Age. The paper calls for further research on the lessons from Poland's successful growth model for other countries in the region and beyond as well as on the long-term implications of the rise of Poland for the future of Europe.
I. INTRODUCTION
Poland, the largest economy among post-socialist EU member states 2 and the sixth largest economy in the European Union on the purchasing power parity basis, has just had probably the best 20 years in more than one thousand years of its history.
Since 1989, when the Solidarity-led social movement spearheaded the collapse of communism, Poland's economy has grown by more than any other country in Europe. It was also one of the fastest growing economies in the world among countries at a similar level of development. Finally, Poland was the only European economy to avoid a recession during the ongoing global crisis, continuously growing since 1992.
As a result, in 2013 Poland has achieved levels of income, quality of life, and well-being never experienced before. This year, its GDP per capita will reach 62 percent of the level of income in the developed countries of Western Europe (Euro-area 17), Poland's natural benchmark and an objective of social aspirations, up from below 30 percent in 1992. It will also achieve the highest level of income relative to Western Europe since the year 1500, thus in just about twenty years offsetting more than 500 years of economic decline, a historically unprecedented achievement.
Aside from the highest absolute and relative incomes, Poland has also likely reached the highest levels of the quality of life, well-being and happiness, the ultimate objectives of economic growth and public policy. Rising incomes, open borders, access to the Internet, and the accession to the European Union have allowed Poland to participate in the global economic, social, cultural and technological progress to an extent never experienced before.
As a result, international rankings of well-being suggest that the quality of life enjoyed by an average Pole is even higher than what the level of GDP per capita alone would suggest.
Perceived happiness is also the highest on record.
Going forward, Poland is well placed to continue converging with Western Europe. Longterm projections by the European Commission, the OECD and independent forecasters suggest that Poland will likely reach up to 80 percent of the EU-15 level of income by 2030, the highest relative level ever. In doing so, Poland will have largely moved from the economic periphery of Europe, "Europe's third world" (Aldcroft 2006) , where it languished for centuries, to the European economic center.
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The 21 st century thus promises to become Poland's new Golden Age.
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At the same time, the rise of Poland and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will help bring the two parts of Europe together for the first time since 16 th century, when the continent split economically: CEE reverted back to feudalism and the resulting economic stagnation, while the West embarked on its long journey to industrialization and prosperity.
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence for the above statements and thus (i) help fill the existing knowledge gap about the economic history of Poland, (ii) provide a new historical perspective to the ongoing debate on the economic future of Poland, and (iii) critically analyze long-term growth projections for Poland. The paper moves away from the usual stock market-like focus on the short-term and re-emphasizes the importance of the long-term perspective. Finally, the paper calls for further research on the lessons from Poland's successful experience for other countries in the region and beyond as well as the long-term implications of the rise of Poland for the functioning of the European Union andthrough the EU-of the global economy. Piatkowski and Jarmuzek (2008) show that during 2004-06 the five global leading newspapers-The Economist, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and International Herald Tribunementioned Poland's economy (relative to its population) less than half as often as Slovakia and even less often than the three Baltic States. 9 As Tony Judt, the late historian put it, "Warsaw is not, and for most of European history never was, the center of very much at all" (Judt, 2012, kindle location 521). might also have been a factor, partly driven by a tradition of qualitative rather than quantitative and internationally comparative research. 10 Similarly, there is not much international interest in Poland's long-term economic future, aside from the largely mandatory work of the international institutions such as the European Commission or the OECD, discussed later in the text.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes Poland's economic performance since the year 1500 until the beginning of transition in 1989. Section III discusses Poland's remarkable performance since then, including the ongoing global crisis. Section IV focuses on the long-term growth projections for Poland and the pace of its convergence with Western Europe. Section V concludes.
II. POLAND'S ECONOMIC DECLINE FROM 1500 TO 1989
In 16 th and 17 th centuries, Poland was one the largest and most populous countries in Europe, with a territory of almost one million square kilometers and a population exceeding 11 million (Davies 2005 , Morawski 2011 However, things were soon to fall apart. Europe started to split in two halves between the ever more prosperous Western Europe and the ever less prosperous Poland and Central Europe, pushing it towards the European and global economic periphery from which it has started to emerge only 500 years later.
There are a number of explanations for why the two parts of the continent started to go different ways. The main line of argument centers on the dramatic increase in international trade following the discovery of America in 1492, which pushed countries to specialize in products in which they possessed a comparative advantage. Western Europe thus started to increasingly specialize in trade, notably with the New World, and manufacturing, while
Poland and the rest of the region shifted towards agriculture (Berend and Ranki 1974, Berend 2005 ).
As a result, the rising grain prices led the Polish nobility to strengthen feudalism, intensify serfdom, and gradually eliminate cities as political and economic powers, exactly in the opposite way as in the West. 16 Innovation also declined, as reflected in the slow expansion of printing presses (Dittmar 2011) . Political stability was in turn undermined by inter alia the 15 Eastern Europe is defined as today's Albania, Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and former Yugoslavia. 16 In the year 1600, urban population of Poland (for towns with a population of at least 10,000 inhabitants) amounted to only 0.4 percent, relative to the Netherlands' 24.3 percent, Belgium's 18.8 percent, Italy's 15.1 percent and the European average of 7.6 percent. The urbanization ratio in 1850 increased to only 9.3 percent, the lowest in Europe next to Austria/Bohemia (Broadberry and Gupta 2011) . 
III. POLAND'S ECONOMIC MIRACLE FOLLOWING THE 1989 TRANSITION

Evolution of GDP per capita
Poland was the first country i communist Europe to unshackle itself from communism, with partly free democratic elections held in June 1989 followed by the introduction of the first democratic government in September of 1989, well before the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year.
Following a number of economic reforms implemented already under the old regime (Kolodko 2000) , in 1990 Poland embarked on a "shock therapy" to reform the old, socialist economic system. Under the new deputy prime minister and minister of finance, Leszek
Balcerowicz, markets were fully opened to domestic and foreign trade, the Polish zloty was made convertible, prices were liberalized, subsidies to state owned enterprises were cut, privatization was started and banking sector reform accelerated (Balcerowicz 1995) .
Although the post-transition recession was much deeper than initially predicted, costing This implies that in just twenty years Poland has managed to offset almost 500 years of economic decline, an unprecedented achievement comparable to the economic success of only some Asian economies such as Japan, Korea and China.
Evolution of well-being
GDP growth, however, is not all. It is by now well recognized that GDP growth by itself does not necessarily fully depict improvements in the overall quality of life and the level of wellbeing (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 2008) . It does not also necessarily buy happiness (Easterlin 1974, Stevenson and Wolfers 2013) .
From the well-being perspective, Poland does even better than on the basis of GDP only. It enjoys historically unparalleled quality of life, which lags behind Western Europe much less than what differences in income would suggest.
Poland's educational, health, environmental, social, and even sport outcomes, all factors found to drive human happiness (Layard 2003 , Bok 2010 , Kahneman 2012 Eurostat's Glossary explains AIC and argues that "although GDP per capita is an important and widely used indicator of countries' level of economic welfare, consumption per capita may be more useful for comparing the relative welfare of consumers across various countries". 22 In the OECD's own words: "There is more to life than the cold numbers of GDP and economic statisticsThis Index allows you to compare well-being across countries, based on 11 topics the OECD has identified as essential, in the areas of material living conditions and quality of life". Quite interestingly, the Index allows users to change the relative weights for subindicators and thus alter the ranking. For instance, raising the weights for "education" and "safety" to their maximum (while keeping other subindicators in the default position) raises Poland's ranking to 22 nd place, beating Spain and Italy. See the index's web site at: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
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In short, Poland's level of social well-being is much closer to Western Europe than what the level of income alone would suggest.
In terms of happiness, the most fickle of all categories, it also seems to have improved considerably from the depths of socialist malaise, as evidenced by domestic (Social Diagnosis 2013) and international sources (Eurofound, 2012) . Poles seem to be happier with life than ever before on record (Figure 7 ). 
IV. THE PROJECTED FUTURE OF POLAND UNTIL 2060
All long-term growth projections conclude that Poland will continue to grow faster than Western Europe and thus continue to converge at least until 2030. This would allow Poland to reach levels of relative income never experienced before of around 80 percent of the EU-15 average income by 2030.
First, the European Commission's 2012 Ageing Report (European Commission 2012) projects that during 2010-2060 Poland will be the second fastest growing economy in the EU, after Bulgaria. Poland's GDP per capita is to grow at an average rate of around 2.0 percent year until 2030 and 1.8 percent on average until 2060, 0.5 percentage points faster than the average for the euro zone (Table 1) . This would allow Poland to exceed 70 percent of the Western European level of income by 2030 and reach 75 percent in 2045. However, owing to negative effects of the projected demographic decline on economic growth, with population projected to fall from 38.2 million in 2012 to 32.6 million in 2060, Poland would fail to fully converge with Western Europe during the projected period. 
Upside risks to the projections
There are strong reasons to believe that Poland's economic performance in the future may again surprise on the upside, as it repeatedly did in the past, including during the global crisis. The pace of Poland's convergence with the West could therefore actually be faster than projected by the forecasters, particularly the European Commission. Thus, Poland's new Golden Age would arrive even sooner. Let us look at the following arguments.
First, the European Commission's projection seems to be somewhat pessimistic. It assumes that the speed of Poland's convergence will slow dramatically already in the ongoing decade 2010-2020 to only 0.6 percentage points a year relative to the euro zone (Table 1 ). This stands in stark contrast to the fact that Poland's average speed of convergence in the last decade amounted to 3.3 percentage points a year. Even more importantly, during 2012-14 the pace of convergence is likely to amount to 1.7 percentage points a year, almost three times faster than the EC's projections (Figure 10 ). Given that the demographic decline is projected to start only after 2020, the major reason for the projected long-term growth slowdown (more Second, the EC report assumes that Poland's pace of convergence will decline mostly owing to negative demographic trends. These show that because of population ageing and continued low fertility (at 1.4 in 2011, below the natural replacement rate of 2.1), Poland's working population will decline quite dramatically by more than 20 percent in the next forty years, undermining economic growth.
However, demographic projections, while correct in a static scenario, are not likely to be correct in a dynamic scenario.
Specifically, and most importantly, demographic projections give no allowance for immigration, even though the past experience of developed countries strongly suggests that
Poland is likely to become a magnet for immigration in the near future. This is especially so Increased immigration would not only upend the current demographic projections, but would also likely increase fiscal revenues, enhance innovation, and safeguard and/or increase competitiveness by helping to keep wage growth in line with growth in productivity (especially when the low saving and investment levels mitigate the potential for labor-saving investment). 26 The latter would be particularly welcome when Poland joins the euro zone to avoid the erosion of competitiveness experienced earlier by Southern Europe. 25 Migration from these countries is already happening: Brunarska, Grotte and Lesinska (2012) quote studies, which estimate that there are 250-300 thousand Ukrainians working in Poland, legally and illegally.
Today, Poland is a clear outlier in terms of inflows of migration. Foreign born population in
Poland is barely existent, representing only 1.8 percent of total population, considerably below the EU-27 average of 6.5 percent, as well as below its regional peers, Czech Republic (3.7 percent) and Hungary (4.7 percent) (Figure 11 ). If Poland followed the footsteps of Portugal, Greece or Slovenia, and there are no clear reasons why it would behave any differently from them, within the next decade or so it should attract additional immigration of around 6-9 percent of total population or almost 3 million of new inhabitants. 24 90 billion euro in today's prices. 29 Further, although smaller, funds will also be available during the next EU budget perspective 2020 onwards. The EU funds will continue to spur the most productive investments in infrastructure, human capital, innovation and ICT. 30 Poland will hence remain one of the largest construction sites in Europe, with new infrastructure that Poland has never had before and that it could not have afforded on its own. For example, Figure 13 shows the unprecedented improvement in the road infrastructure in Poland in the last decade: between 2000 and 2013 the length of highway and express roads has increased fivefold. 31 These investments, together with further large outlays on the highway, railway and-most importantly-broadband network will spur economic growth for decades to come. 32 If Poland has managed to become Europe's growth champion without good roads, railways and broadband, would it not continue to grow fast with them?
In addition, Poland's convergence will be supported by further integration of the EU markets, especially in the service sector, helping Poland to benefit from its low cost, but high quality of services, and introduction of free trade zones with countries like the neighboring Ukraine, which will favor Poland more than other EU members. On the whole, ever closer integration of Europe will continue to be a blessing for Poland.
29 Calculated as the original cost of around $13 billion times inflation from 1950/51 until 2012 based on http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ and divided by the current US$/euro exchange rate. 30 Although there may be some doubts as to the efficiency of some of the EU-financed spending, especially on innovation (World Bank 2012). 31 Poland actually never had a good road infrastructure: Osęka (2011) The old, 50+ generation has throughout their lives acquired skills, which allowed them to survive under communism, but have proven difficult to thrive in capitalism. Kafkaesque 33 Landes (1998 ), North (2005 and Clark (2007) among others emphasize the importance of culture, values and the social environment for long-term economic growth. As Albert Einstein said, "not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts." 34 Crunching numbers in growth models without adjusting for the generational difference could be likened to comparing old Soviet and American computers: the same name, but quite a difference in performance.
incentives, lack of innovation, acceptance of mediocre quality, lack of focus on customer service and satisfaction, and a guarantee of employment promoted a skill set and mentality that are not the same as those needed today in modern European capitalism. 35 The work ethos also suffered, following in the footsteps of earlier generations.
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In turn, the young generation of Poles today is probably the most competitive Polish generation ever. Anecdotal and formal evidence (Social Diagnosis 2011 , Boni 2011 suggests that the new generation is more materially motivated, more assertive, and more focused on success than the old generation. It is also much more travelled, cosmopolitan, urban, open-minded and European. It is also significantly better educated: only 13 percent of the generation aged 55-64 has tertiary education relative to 39 percent for those aged 25-34, one of the largest differences among the OECD countries (OECD 2013) . The new generation is also widely perceived to be among the most productive and hard working in Europe, in reversal of old stereotypes.
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In addition to all these factors, Poland's growth is also likely to be supported by the low level of social inequality and high social mobility 38 , the planned adoption of the euro
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, diversified exports (with no single industry representing more than 10 percent of total exports), strong economic links with Germany, and a healthy, utility-like banking sector. Moreover, Poland 35 As the old saying under communism went, "we pretend to work, they pretend to pay us". 36 Post-1945 attitudes to work were in fact not much different than those before 1945: Jacob (1826, p. 30, 65, 79-80) argues that XIX century Polish serf farm workers tended to be negligent, lazy, and drunken, arguably because of lack of incentives to be productive when providing services to their noble masters for free. The latter, in turn, looked down on any sort of business as not in line with their social status. Involvement in commerce "would be treated by others as having lost their caste and descended to a lower rank of society" (Jacob 1828, p. 79) . As a result, the commanding heights of the Polish economy were occupied by foreigners or by the Jewish minority (Jacob, ibid.) . These anti-business attitudes among the gentry largely persisted until 1939, undermining Poland's growth and convergence. Turnock (2006, p. 10) argues that before the Second World War "the contributions of the aristocracy to modernization were seen more through military service and administration than through enterprise". Morawski (2011) adds that during the 15 th and 16 th century nobility could be forfeited if a nobleman was engaged in "city activities", trade and business. The law was repealed in 1775, but the social stigma of being pro-business remained. 37 See, for instance, The Economist, "Another kind of health tourism", June 8, 2013, arguing that "the first thing Polish immigrants brought to Britain (…) was an admirable work ethic". 38 As regards some anecdotal evidence for social mobility, hardly any of the leading economic policy makers in Poland in the last 25 years has come from a privileged social background. 39 According to pre-euro crisis estimates of Schadler et al. (2006) and the National Bank of Poland (2009), owing to higher trade, higher investment, lower risk premia, and the elimination of currency exchange costs, adoption of the euro would increase GDP growth in Poland by between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points annually. could also benefit from the recently discovered large deposits of shale gas, which could ensure its energy independence. It is also less exposed to the potentially negative effects of global warming (World Bank 2013).
Finally, Poland seems to have already avoided the "middle-income trap". The concept, developed by Gill and Kharas (2007) , is based on a finding that growth in many developing countries slows and convergence falters when they reach a middle-income status as the simple growth reserves largely based on cheap labor dissipate. While the very existence of the trap is disputed (The Economist, 2013b), the good news is that Poland, with an income of $21,000 PPP per capita in 2012, seems to have already passed the "trap", which Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2013) estimate may exist in countries with an income level per capita at around $15,000-16,000 PPP. In addition, Poland is already considered a "high-income" country by the OECD and the World Bank, as mentioned earlier.
Downside risks
Granted, economic projections for Poland also face a number of downside risks, which could slow the speed of convergence. These include low saving and investment rate, low level and low efficiency of spending on innovation, low labor participation rate, still rather unfriendly business climate or a low level of social trust.
As regards saving and investment, Poland does not save enough to support high investment rates and to insulate the economy from future crises by lessening reliance on import of foreign capital, especially of the fickle portfolio capital. Countries that have successfully caught up with developed countries, mostly in Asia, saved and invested on average more than 30% of GDP (World Bank 2008). However, Poland's saving and investment rate is much lower: during 2004-2011, the average saving rate amounted to only 17% of GDP, while investment to only 21% of GDP, below the EU average and most regional peers (Geodecki et al. 2013) .
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The low level and efficiency of spending on innovation and R&D is also an issue. Despite a significant rise in EU-financed spending supporting public and private R&D effort, investment in R&D in 2012 increased to only 0.7 percent of GDP, much below the EU average. The private sector spent less than one-third of the total amount, in contrast to Western Europe, where the roles of the private and public sector in R&D spending are reversed. Even more worryingly, whatever is spent on R&D and innovation does not seem to translate into increased output of innovative products and services (World Bank 2012). As a result, Poland continues to lag behind most EU countries in innovation rankings. For instance, the 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard classifies Poland only in the 24 th place in the EU-27 in terms of the overall innovation performance.
Finally, despite much recent progress, the business climate is still far from friendly. While
Poland has managed to become the fastest reformer worldwide in the World Bank's Doing
Business 2013, it is nonetheless still classified in the 55 th place overall, below the EU average.
While it is not clear to what extent all these risks could negatively affect the growth rate in the long-term, notably since they have not prevented Poland from becoming the European growth champion in the last twenty years, it would still be pragmatic to base economic policy on the assumption of the unfolding of a worst case scenario and focus on mitigating the downside risks to growth. 40 Such economic policy could be based on a re-adjusted growth model, such as the "Warsaw Consensus" recommended by Piatkowski (2011) , which inter alia argues for increasing domestic savings, raising the employment rate, enhancing innovation, controlling real exchange rate appreciation, diversifying exports and maintaining largely conservative financial sector supervision, while increasing focus on policies to promote well-being and happiness, going beyond GDP only.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Poland has likely never had it so good before. The distance between Poland's and Western
Europe's level of income, quality of life, and perceived happiness now seems to be the shortest since at least the 16 th century. The Polish Golden Age, however, will not arrive automatically. Policy makers will need to stay committed to keep the convergence going, especially as it will get more difficult to grow 30 as Poland closes the developmental distance to the West. It will be critical to inter alia focus on increasing domestic savings, raising labor participation, keeping a competitive exchange rate and opening labor markets to immigration. Poland will also need to start to innovate rather not only imitate. The unprecedented historical chance of catching up with the West should concentrate minds, promote ever stronger leadership and strengthen commitment to reforms among all political forces. Catching-up with the West is a marathon, not a sprint, and the cooperation of all Poles will be needed to achieve it. Poland has a rendezvous with history that it should not miss.
